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Abstract 9 
Many primate species have a strong disposition to approach and manipulate objects in captivity. 10 
However, few studies have investigated what primates learn during free exploration of objects in 11 
the absence of rewards, and how previous problem-solving performance influences subsequent 12 
exploration. We confronted members of each of the four non-human great ape species (N = 25) 13 
with the collapsible platform task that required subjects to drop a stone inside a tube to collapse a 14 
platform and release a reward. Subjects received four successive sessions with an empty 15 
apparatus (exploration driven by intrinsic motivation) followed by four with a baited apparatus 16 
(problem-solving driven by extrinsic motivation) or vice versa. Apes who first faced an empty 17 
apparatus solved the task more quickly in the baited condition than apes who started with this 18 
condition. Moreover, apes starting with the baited condition took longer to collapse the platform 19 
in the first trial than apes who started with the empty condition. This study suggests that apes 20 
exposed to an empty apparatus prior to the test gain information that is later used to solve the 21 
task in a more efficient manner. Thus, the apes learned about action-outcome contingencies 22 
during free exploration. Moreover, it indicates that the presence of food rewards distracts apes 23 
and delays problem-solving because apes’ attention is mainly focused on the food. 24 
Keywords: primates, tool use, prior experience, intrinsic motivation, exploration  25 
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Introduction 26 
Many animal species show interest in novel objects by orienting, approaching, or manipulating 27 
them (e.g., Berlyne & Slater, 1957; Burghardt, 2006; Glickman & Sroges, 1966; Mather & 28 
Anderson, 1999; Torigoe, 1985). Several non-human primate species, in particular, display a 29 
strong disposition to manipulate objects, with great apes, capuchins and baboons showing the 30 
greatest interest and most diverse manipulations (Glickman & Sroges, 1966; Tomasello & Call, 31 
1997; Torigoe, 1985; Welker, 1956). Exploration of objects does not necessarily yield an 32 
immediate extrinsic reward (e.g., in the form of food) but it may enhance future problem-solving 33 
performance (e.g., Gajdon, Lichtnegger, & Huber, 2014; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2014; 34 
Taffoni et al., 2014) and might be an essential component of flexible tool-use (Call, 2013). In 35 
fact, learning about action-outcome contingencies during exploration may facilitate a much 36 
broader application of this knowledge compared to situations in which the knowledge was 37 
acquired while obtaining a tangible reward such as food (Call, 2013).  38 
Several studies have suggested that high levels of exploration can lead to increased 39 
problem-solving success in non-human animals (e.g., Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; 40 
Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2013; Griffin, Diquelou, & Perea, 2014; Griffin & 41 
Guez, 2014; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1989; Visalberghi & Trinca, 1989; Webster & Lefebvre, 42 
2001). For example, wild spotted hyenas that showed more diverse exploratory actions were 43 
more likely to open a puzzle box than less exploratory individuals (Benson-Amram and 44 
Holekamp, 2012). Similarly, wild-caught Indian mynas that manipulated a puzzle box in more 45 
diverse ways opened more food compartments than individuals that showed less diverse 46 
manipulations (Griffin et al., 2014). Exploration has been elicited in numerous studies by 47 
extrinsic motivation, e.g., food incentives (e.g., Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Benson-48 
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Amram et al., 2013; Griffin et al., 2014). However, what individuals learn about their 49 
environment in the absence of food incentives clearly warrants further investigation. 50 
Intrinsic motivation may stimulate exploration of novel objects and novel environments 51 
when individuals are in a relaxed state (e.g., Hughes, 1997). Knowledge gained in such situations 52 
may enhance future problem-solving performance (e.g., Birch, 1945a; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 53 
2014), since this type of knowledge is less tied to a specific situation, and it might be especially 54 
useful when encountering novel problems (Call, 2013). However, few studies have investigated 55 
the relationship between exploration and problem-solving. Before delving into those studies a 56 
terminological clarification is required. Although the term problem-solving typically refers to 57 
situations in which object manipulation is driven by extrinsic motivation (e.g., food, escape), the 58 
use of the term exploration is less clear regarding its underlying motivational substrate. For the 59 
sake of clarity, in this paper we use the term problem-solving to refer to manipulation driven by 60 
extrinsic motivation and the term exploration to refer to manipulation driven by intrinsic 61 
motivation. 62 
In a classical study, Birch (1945a) tested chimpanzees in a food raking task. While most 63 
individuals initially failed to rake in the food with a hoe, they succeeded after a phase of free 64 
exploration with sticks, suggesting that they gained knowledge about functional features of stick-65 
like objects. Similarly, female gibbons that were exposed to a rake before the test were faster in 66 
raking in a food reward than naive gibbons (Cunningham, Anderson, & Mootnick, 2011). 67 
Gajdon et al. (2014) reported that keas that combined objects and tubes during free exploration in 68 
the absence of a food incentive later solved a baited tube puzzle by inserting an object, 69 
suggesting that exploration enhanced later problem-solving performance. Despite these 70 
suggestive results, the fact that all keas received the same presentation order of the conditions 71 
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means that subjects may have also solved the task without a prior exploratory phase. Polizzi di 72 
Sorrentino et al. (2014) used a superior design by confronting capuchin monkeys with a 73 
mechatronic board at which they could perform diverse actions that resulted in predictable 74 
outcomes in one group (i.e., the same actions led to the same outcomes) and in arbitrary 75 
outcomes in the other group (i.e., the same actions led to different outcomes; see also Taffoni et 76 
al., 2014 for a similar study with human children). For example, pushing a specific button caused 77 
a specific visual (i.e., light) and auditory (i.e., tone) response for one group while it caused 78 
varying visual and auditory responses in the other group. After a phase of free exploration a box 79 
inside the apparatus that could be opened only by one specific action was baited. Capuchin 80 
monkeys who learned about action-outcome contingencies in a predictable environment retrieved 81 
the reward more often, suggesting that exploration enhanced problem-solving performance. 82 
Dunbar, McAdam, and O'Connell (2005) investigated how chimpanzees, orang-utans and human 83 
children solved a set of four puzzle boxes. One group of subjects was exposed to the boxes 84 
before the test phase while the other group received no such exposure. One attractive feature of 85 
this study is that individuals in the exposure group did not actually manipulate the boxes, they 86 
could just look at them. Nevertheless, individuals with prior exposure were faster in solving the 87 
puzzle boxes in the test phase than those without prior exposure (though there might be a 88 
confound with order of presentation, see Dunbar et al., 2005). 89 
Although prior experience may enhance future problem-solving performance, it may also 90 
have the opposite effect in some situations (e.g., Duncker, 1945; Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call, 91 
2011; Luchins & Luchins, 1959). For instance, Hanus et al. (2011) confronted chimpanzees with 92 
the floating peanut task, which required subjects to spit water into a vertical tube to make a 93 
shelled peanut float upwards. Some chimpanzees only solved the task after they had been 94 
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provided with a new water dispenser. The authors suggest that the old water dispenser may 95 
already have had the function of drinking (and spitting at conspecifics or people) and that this 96 
prior experience hindered the chimpanzees to use it in the context of the given task ("functional 97 
fixedness effect", Duncker, 1945; Hanus et al., 2011). Hrubesch, Preuschoft, and van Schaik 98 
(2009) reported that chimpanzees stuck to a less effective problem-solving technique even 99 
though a more effective one was available and clearly observable in other group members, 100 
suggesting that prior experience hindered them to adopt a more efficient problem-solving 101 
strategy. Field data support the idea that chimpanzees stay with a familiar problem-solving 102 
strategy instead of trying new and potentially more effective ones (e.g., Gruber, Muller, 103 
Reynolds, Wrangham, & Zuberbuhler, 2011; Gruber, Muller, Strimling, Wrangham, & 104 
Zuberbuehler, 2009). 105 
Another important modulator of problem-solving performance is individuals’ 106 
motivational state. Levels of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation determine the general interest in a 107 
problem. The level of extrinsic motivation depends on the satiation of the individual and the 108 
value of the food reward (i.e., quantity and quality). Individuals with a low extrinsic motivation 109 
might perform only a few attempts to solve a problem, resulting in poor performance. However, 110 
individuals with a high extrinsic motivation might narrow down their focus onto the food and 111 
disregard other important aspects of the problem, again causing a reduced performance. For 112 
example, Birch (1945b) reported that chimpanzees presented with various problem-solving tasks 113 
performed best in a state of medium extrinsic motivation compared to a low or high state of 114 
extrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation was induced by varying hours of food deprivation. 115 
This study suggests that chimpanzees who were insufficiently or excessively motivated to access 116 
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the food, performed worse than those who were moderately motivated. A detrimental effect of 117 
high incentives was also found in humans (e.g., Glucksberg, 1964).  118 
The level of intrinsic motivation to engage in exploration may vary across individuals 119 
(e.g., Uher, Asendorpf, & Call, 2008; Zampachova, Kaftanova, Simankova, Landova, & Frynta, 120 
2017) and depend on features and novelty of the objects or the environment (e.g., Dubois, 121 
Gerard, & Pontes, 2005; Hughes, 1997; Welker, 1956) and plausibly, a relaxed emotional state. 122 
For example, individuals that experience fear show avoidance reactions instead of exploring an 123 
object (Hughes, 1997; Welker, 1957). Some studies have revealed an intrinsic motivation to 124 
solve problems for their own sake. For example, Menzel (1991) gave chimpanzees a choice 125 
between performing a discrimination task to gain a piece of food, or to take a freely available 126 
one. Some of the chimpanzees consistently preferred to perform the task, although they 127 
sometimes lost food when they made mistakes. Overall, those who chose to perform the task 128 
gained less food than individuals who selected the freely available option (Menzel, 1991). More 129 
recently, Clark and Smith (2013) reported that chimpanzees showed a higher interest towards 130 
objects than towards food rewards, that is, they spent more time with a maze of opaque tubes 131 
when it was filled with non-food objects than when it was filled with food rewards. Although the 132 
non-food condition was presented first and the finding might be based on a novelty effect, 133 
chimpanzees readily explored the maze without being rewarded for doing so. 134 
Although some studies have shown that non-human primates can benefit from 135 
exploration when they subsequently face the same task in a problem-solving situation (e.g., 136 
Birch, 1945a; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2014), little is known about how problem-solving may 137 
subsequently affect exploration. In other words, whereas several studies have documented that 138 
exploration enhances problem-solving, it is unclear whether problem-solving in turn enhances or 139 
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reduces exploration. Additionally, it is unclear how intrinsic and extrinsic motivation impact on 140 
subjects’ first and subsequent responses after repeated task presentations. To address these 141 
questions, we sought a task with a relatively complex solution, ideally involving the use of 142 
objects in some way, that afforded two versions, one driven by intrinsic motivation (empty 143 
apparatus: exploration) and another driven by extrinsic motivation (baited apparatus: problem-144 
solving). We selected the collapsible platform task, which was originally used with corvids and 145 
that requires subjects to drop a stone inside a box to collapse a platform located inside it to 146 
release a piece of food (Bird & Emery, 2009; von Bayern, Heathcote, Rutz, & Kacelnik, 2009). 147 
In the current study we therefore investigated the role of prior experience in problem-148 
solving in the four non-human great ape species using the collapsible platform task, which meets 149 
our requirements about complexity and motivation, and has not been employed with non-human 150 
primates yet. Subjects were given four sessions with the baited and four with the empty 151 
condition, counterbalanced for order of presentation across subjects. Furthermore, the inclusion 152 
of repeated trials allowed us to assess whether both types of motivation were capable of 153 
sustaining subjects’ responses over time to the same degree. Based on previous studies we 154 
expected that apes with prior experience in the empty condition would be faster in the baited 155 
condition than apes without prior experience. Additionally, if subjects solved the baited 156 
apparatus faster than the empty apparatus in the very first trial, this would indicate that extrinsic 157 
motivation exerted a more potent effect on their responses than intrinsic motivation. Conversely, 158 
if subjects solved the empty apparatus more quickly than the baited apparatus, this would 159 
indicate that intrinsic motivation exerted a more potent effect than extrinsic motivation. 160 
Additionally, the setup allowed us to investigate how problem-solving affects exploration, an 161 
aspect that has received little attention compared to how exploration affects problem-solving. 162 
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 163 
Methods 164 
Subjects 165 
Eight bonobos (Pan paniscus), seven chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), four gorillas (Gorilla 166 
gorilla) and six Sumatran orang-utans (Pongo abelii) housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate 167 
Research Center (Zoo Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany) participated in this study (N = 25; Table S1). 168 
There were 18 females and seven males ranging from five to 48 years of age. Seven apes were 169 
nursery reared, 15 apes were mother reared and the upbringing of three apes was unknown. All 170 
subjects lived in social groups of various sizes with access to indoor and outdoor areas. Subjects 171 
were individually tested in their indoor sleeping rooms (hereafter, “test rooms”). They were 172 
neither food- nor water-deprived throughout the study. We used a highly preferred food item as 173 
incentive (banana pellet) that was not part of the daily diet. The apes had participated in multiple 174 
cognitive tests before the current study, some of which required inserting objects into tubes (e.g., 175 
Martin-Ordas & Call, 2009). All applicable international, national and institutional guidelines for 176 
animal behavioral research were followed. 177 
Materials 178 
The apparatus consisted of a transparent box (bonobos, gorillas: L 20 cm × W 20 cm × H 20 cm; 179 
chimpanzees, orang-utans: L 22 cm × W 21 cm × H 21 cm) with an opening at its lower end  180 
(L 18 cm × W 2.5 cm resp. 3 cm) and a tube (L 18.5 cm × W 5 cm) attached onto its top (Figure 181 
1; see also Bird & Emery, 2009). Inside the box a platform was held parallel to the ceiling of the 182 
box by a magnet. The platform could be released by inserting a stone into the tube so that its 183 
weight collapsed the platform. Three stones were placed at each side of the apparatus on a 184 
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protruding edge (distance: about 20 cm). We used plaster stones with the bonobos but then 185 
switched to PVC stones with two bonobos and to real stones with one bonobo (two bonobos bit 186 
pieces off the stones and one stopped exchanging them). Orang-utans, gorillas and chimpanzees 187 
were always tested with PVC stones. All stones used weighed between 15 and 20 grams and 188 
were originally grey (PVC, real stones) or painted grey with a non-poisonous color (plaster). 189 
Procedure 190 
In the baited condition, the apparatus was baited with a banana pellet except for one bonobo who 191 
preferred grapes over pellets. In the empty condition, the apparatus was left empty. Apes 192 
received four consecutive sessions with each of the conditions, counterbalanced for order across 193 
subjects. Groups were established by sorting apes into dyads (with regard to species, age and 194 
sex) and then randomly distributing them to the two groups (pseudo-randomization). We 195 
conducted one session per day which lasted 30 minutes maximum. A session comprised three 196 
trials with an inter-trial-interval of about two minutes, resulting in twelve trials per condition 197 
(like in von Bayern, Heathcote, Rutz, & Kacelnik, 2009). If subjects solved the task three times, 198 
or 30 minutes had passed, the session was finished. When subjects solved the task, they left the 199 
test room, the apparatus was re-baited and six stones were replaced. When subjects took stones 200 
with them, we did not exchange these for a food reward because we did not want subjects to 201 
establish a positive association with the stones. Thus, apes sometimes brought stones with them 202 
on consecutive trials which they possibly used to solve the task. All sessions were videotaped. 203 
Analyses 204 
We measured success (X out of 3 trials) and survival time (a combination of time passed and 205 
success) per session, as well as latency until success, latency until touching the stones, and 206 
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manipulation time using INTERACT 9 (Mangold International). We further measured food-207 
directed actions in the baited condition (i.e., manipulations at the tube hole, the lower box 208 
opening, directly above the reward or attempts to open the box by biting, hitting, or tearing) or 209 
manipulations at the respective locations of the apparatus in the empty condition using Solomon 210 
Coder (Péter, 2011). Latency until success and survival time started with first visual inspection. 211 
While latency could be established for successful individuals only, survival time could be 212 
determined for both successful and unsuccessful individuals. Survival time consists of a 213 
combination of how much time has passed (duration in frames) and if an event has occurred or 214 
not (success: yes or no). A second coder coded 20 percent of the videos and reliability was 215 
excellent (Pearson’s correlation coefficient: success, r = 1, df = 38, p < 0.001; survival time, r = 216 
1, df = 38, p < 0.001; latency to success, r = 0.994, df = 26, p < 0.001; manipulation, r = 0.997, 217 
df = 38, p < 0.001). 218 
A generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with a Poisson error structure was performed 219 
in R (R Core Team, 2013) with successful trials per session as the response (R-package lme4, 220 
Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). The model included group, condition, session, 221 
species, sex, age, and duration of stay at the holding facility as predictors, as well as the three-222 
way-interaction between group, condition, and session. We used the duration that apes spent at 223 
our research facility as an additional variable as a proxy for apes’ experience with cognitive 224 
studies. For apes who were born at the holding facility, we counted the months from their third 225 
birthday on because apes started to participate in studies around this age. Age was log-226 
transformed and age, session as well as duration of stay at the holding facility were standardized 227 
to their respective means. As random effects the random intercept of subject and the random 228 
slopes of condition, session, and the product of condition and session within subject were 229 
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included in the model (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 2009). We 230 
tested the overall effect of the predictors by comparing the full model with the null model 231 
comprising only the random effects employing a likelihood ratio test (Schielzeth & Forstmeier, 232 
2009; R function anova with argument test set to "Chisq"). As a next step, non-significant 233 
interactions were excluded from the model (group x condition x session, χ2 = 2.05, df = 1, p = 234 
0.152; group x condition, χ2 = 0.58, df = 1, p = 0.445; group x session, χ2 = 0.12, df = 1, p = 235 
0.730) and p-values for the individual predictors were established using likelihood ratio tests 236 
comparing the full with the respective reduced models (Barr et al., 2013; R function drop1). To 237 
further investigate significant interactions, we re-leveled the respective factors involved.  238 
We assessed model stability by visually inspecting the estimates derived by a model 239 
based on all data with those obtained from models with levels of the random effects excluded 240 
one at a time. Model stability was considered acceptable when the results did not change 241 
considerably compared to the results based on the entire dataset. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF, 242 
Field, 2005) were derived using the function vif of the R-package car (Fox & Weisberg, 2011) 243 
applied to a standard linear model excluding random effects and interactions, and did not 244 
indicate collinearity to be an issue. Overdispersion did not appear to be a problem (dispersion 245 
parameter: 0.331). We established confidence intervals (CIs) by parametric bootstrapping (R 246 
function bootMer from the package lme4) and assessed an R2-like effect size (‘marginal’ R2, the 247 
variance explained by the fixed effects). 248 
For further analyses, we excluded six subjects who did not solve the task because we 249 
were interested in how the conditions modulate problem-solving performance of those who knew 250 
how to solve it. We also excluded the two remaining gorillas who caused a problem of complete 251 
separation in the model, resulting in a sample comprising seven bonobos, four chimpanzees and 252 
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six orang-utans. A Cox mixed model with survival time as the response was performed in R 253 
(Therneau, 2012). The model included the same fixed and random effects structure as before but 254 
additionally, the interaction of species and condition was added. We tested the overall effect of 255 
the predictors by comparing the full with the null model comprising only the random effects, 256 
employing a likelihood ratio test which was based on the “integrated” likelihood provided by the 257 
function “coxme”. We established p-values for the individual predictors using again likelihood 258 
ratio tests comparing the full with the respective reduced models. We examined significant 259 
interactions by re-leveling the respective factors. Model stability was assessed the same way as 260 
in the GLMM for number of successful trials per session and was acceptable. 261 
We analyzed how apes from the two groups reacted to the two conditions by analyzing 262 
their behavior in the first trial of each of the conditions. Only individuals who were successful in 263 
both first trials were included, resulting in a sample comprising five bonobos, three chimpanzees 264 
and six orang-utans. We conducted four linear mixed models (LMMs) with latency until success, 265 
latency until touching the stones, manipulation time and food-directed actions as the response. 266 
All four responses were log-transformed. Each model included the interaction between group 267 
and condition as well as the random intercept of subject. We established p-values in the same 268 
way as it was done in the GLMM for number of successful trials per session. We assessed 269 
normal distribution and homogeneity of the residuals by plotting the residuals (i.e., conducting a 270 
qq-plot and plotting residuals against fitted values) and they were rated good for all four models. 271 
VIFs did not indicate collinearity to be an issue and model stability for the four models was 272 
acceptable. CIs and effect sizes were established as in the Poisson model. 273 
 274 
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Results 275 
Success 276 
Seventy-six percent of the great apes solved the task at least once (seven bonobos, four 277 
chimpanzees, two gorillas and six orang-utans). Most of these apes solved the task in both 278 
conditions with the exception of three apes (one bonobo and two gorillas) from the empty-first 279 
group who solved the task in the baited condition only. Also, one bonobo from the baited-first 280 
group solved the task (twice) in the empty condition only. Six apes (one bonobo, three 281 
chimpanzees, and two gorillas) did not solve the task at all (see SOM for more details).  282 
Figure 2 presents the success as a function of condition and group. The full model was 283 
significant compared to the respective null model (GLMM; likelihood ratio test: χ2 = 59.53, df = 284 
13, p < 0.001; ‘marginal’ R2 = 0.49). We found the interaction of condition and session to be 285 
significant (χ2 = 10.00, df = 1, p = 0.002). Exploring the interaction further revealed that apes’ 286 
success declined over sessions in the empty condition (p < 0.001) while it stayed at high levels in 287 
the baited condition. While there was a general decline in the empty condition, there was 288 
remarkable variation among individuals in this condition and some apes continued dropping 289 
stones (success in the empty condition, mean: 31 %, minimum: 0 %, maximum: 92 %). We did 290 
not find an effect of group, that is, apes’ performance was not dependent on the order of 291 
presentation of the two conditions (χ2 = 0.15, df = 1, p = 0.702). We observed a significant effect 292 
for age with older individuals being less successful (χ2 = 4.76, df = 1, p = 0.029). The duration of 293 
the stay at the holding facility revealed significance with those apes who arrived more recently 294 
being less successful (χ2 = 19.89, df = 1, p < 0.001). Neither sex (χ2 = 0.16, df = 1, p = 0.688), 295 
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nor species (χ2 = 5.56, df = 3, p = 0.135) influenced apes’ performance. See Table 1 for the 296 
results of the individual predictors.  297 
A closer inspection of the factors age and duration of the stay at the holding facility 298 
revealed that their effect was probably driven by the six apes who completely failed the task. To 299 
investigate the influence of the two factors on apes’ problem-solving performance more closely, 300 
we excluded these six apes and repeated the analysis. The influence of the duration of stay at the 301 
holding facility ceased to be significant (χ2 = 1.08, df = 1, p = 0.298) and the age effect became a 302 
trend into the opposite direction with older subjects tending to be more successful (χ2 = 3.48, df = 303 
1, p = 0.062). However, one must be cautious in comparing these two models directly as 304 
excluding a fourth of the sample constitutes a substantial change. 305 
Latencies 306 
Figure 3 presents the survival time as a function of condition and group. The full model 307 
was significant compared to the respective null model (Cox mixed model; likelihood ratio test: χ2 308 
= 70.67, df = 14, p < 0.001). We found a significant three-way interaction between group, 309 
condition and session (χ2 = 8.40, df = 1, p = 0.004). Exploring the interaction further revealed 310 
that apes from the baited-first group showed opposite patterns for the two conditions: they 311 
became faster over sessions in the baited condition (p < 0.001; see also SV1, SV2, SV4 and 312 
SV5) and slower over sessions in the empty condition (p < 0.001). Apes from the empty-first 313 
group also became slower over sessions in the empty condition (p = 0.028) but they did not show 314 
a decline in survival time in the baited condition as they solved the task quickly from the first 315 
trial onwards. Moreover, we found a significant interaction of condition and species (χ2 = 7.00, 316 
df = 2, p = 0.030). Exploring the interaction did not reveal a difference between the species 317 
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except for one trend: orang-utans tended to solve the task more slowly than bonobos in the empty 318 
condition (p = 0.077). We found a trend for age with older subjects tending to solve the task 319 
more quickly than younger ones (χ2 = 3.08, df = 1, p = 0.079). Neither sex (χ2 = 2.10, df = 1, p = 320 
0.148), nor duration of the stay at the holding facility (χ2 = 0.54, df = 1, p = 0.462) showed a 321 
significant influence. See Table 2 for the results of the individual predictors.  322 
Figure 4A shows the latency until success in the first trials of each condition as a function 323 
of condition and group. The full model was significant compared to the null model (LMM; 324 
likelihood ratio test: χ2 = 10.01, df = 3, p = 0.019; ‘marginal’ R2 = 0.31). We found a significant 325 
interaction between group and condition (χ2 = 6.40, df = 1, p = 0.011). Exploring the interaction 326 
further revealed that apes from the baited-first group took longer to solve the task in the baited 327 
condition than apes from the empty-first group (p = 0.002) while there was no such difference 328 
between groups in the empty condition. Apes from the baited-first group also took longer to 329 
solve the task for the very first time than apes from the empty-first group (session 1; p = 0.011; 330 
see also SV1, SV3, SV4 and SV6) while there was no such difference between the two groups 331 
when they switched to the respective other condition (i.e., session 5). Moreover, apes from both 332 
groups tended to become faster from the first to the second condition that they received (baited-333 
first group: p = 0.056; empty-first group: p = 0.074). See Table 3 for the results of the individual 334 
predictors. 335 
Figure 4B shows the latency until touching the stones in the first trials of each condition 336 
as a function of condition and group. Apes did not differ with regard to this measurement (LMM; 337 
full-null-model comparison: likelihood ratio test, χ2 = 2.31, df = 3, p = 0.510). Besides latencies, 338 
we also investigated how much time subjects devoted to manipulating the apparatus in general 339 
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and specifically at the food location (or the corresponding location in the case of the empty 340 
condition). 341 
Apparatus exploration 342 
Figure 5A shows manipulation time as a function of condition and group in the first trials 343 
of each condition. The full model was significant compared to the null model (LMM; likelihood 344 
ratio test: χ2 = 15.63, df = 3, p = 0.001; ‘marginal’ R2 = 0.44). We found a significant interaction 345 
between group and condition (χ2 = 13.86, df = 1, p < 0.001). Exploring the interaction further 346 
revealed that apes from the baited-first group manipulated the apparatus more in the baited 347 
condition than apes from the empty-first group (p < 0.001) while apes from the empty-first group 348 
manipulated the apparatus more in the empty condition than apes from the baited-first group (p = 349 
0.037). Apes from the baited-first group also manipulated the apparatus more than apes from the 350 
empty-first group when they were confronted with the apparatus for the very first time (session 351 
1; p = 0.017) while there was no such difference between the two groups when they switched to 352 
the respective other condition (session 5). Finally, apes from both groups manipulated the 353 
apparatus less from the first to the second condition that they received (baited-first group: p < 354 
0.001, empty-first group: p = 0.044). See Table 4 for the results of the individual predictors.  355 
Figure 5B shows the duration of food-directed actions (or actions directed at the 356 
corresponding location in the case of the empty condition) as a function of condition and group 357 
in the first trials of each condition. The full model was significant compared to the respective 358 
null model (LMM; likelihood ratio test: χ2 = 9.18, df = 3, p = 0.027; ‘marginal’ R2 = 0.29). We 359 
found a significant interaction between group and condition (χ2 = 8.54, df = 1, p = 0.003). 360 
Exploring the interaction further revealed that apes from the baited-first group showed more 361 
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food-directed actions in the baited condition than apes from the empty-first group (p = 0.010) 362 
and apes from the empty-first group tended to show more such actions in the empty condition 363 
than apes from the baited-first group (p = 0.092). Moreover, apes from the baited-first group 364 
showed more food-directed actions in the first compared to the second condition that they 365 
received (session 1; p = 0.012) while this was only a trend for apes from the empty-first group 366 
(session 5; p = 0.079). See Table 5 for the results of the individual predictors.  367 
Furthermore, we explored the relative time that apes from the four species manipulated 368 
the apparatus with their hands and mouths (N = 25). We found a different pattern for the two 369 
conditions (LMM; full-null-model comparison, likelihood ratio test: χ2 = 17.86, df = 7, p = 370 
0.013; likelihood ratio test for species x condition: χ2 = 9.41, df = 3, p = 0.024): while there was 371 
no species difference in the baited condition, orang-utans manipulated the apparatus significantly 372 
longer than the other species in the empty condition (p = 0.028). Additionally, bonobos 373 
manipulated the apparatus significantly longer in the baited than in the empty condition (p < 374 
0.001) whereas there was no difference between conditions for the other ape species (baited – 375 
bonobos: 12±12%; chimpanzees:  9±12%; gorillas: 12±15%; orang-utans: 14±14%; empty – 376 
bonobos: 3±6%; chimpanzees: 4±6%; gorillas: 1±1%; orang-utans: 13±15%; percent of time 377 
manipulating the apparatus with hand or mouth, mean±sd.; Figure S1A and videos SV1-6; please 378 
see SOM for more details). Additionally, we found a significant difference between conditions 379 
with regard to tool-use: apes manipulated the apparatus significantly longer with stones in the 380 
baited than in the empty condition (LMM; full-null-model comparison, likelihood ratio test: χ2 = 381 
21.38, df = 7, p = 0.003; likelihood ratio test for condition: χ2 = 18.64, df = 1, p < 0.001) while 382 
there was no effect of species (χ2 = 2.65, df = 3, p = 0.448; baited – bonobos: 13±15%; 383 
chimpanzees: 11±13%; gorillas: 6±9%; orang-utans: 13±12%; empty – bonobos: 3±6%; 384 
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chimpanzees: 3±9%; gorillas: 0±0%; orang-utans: 3±5%; Figure S1B, Table S2 and videos SV1-385 
6; please see SOM for more details). 386 
 387 
Discussion 388 
When apes encountered the collapsible platform task for the first time, they solved it more 389 
quickly when the apparatus was empty than when it was baited, indicating that the presence of a 390 
food reward retarded the use of a stone to collapse the platform. Subjects starting with the baited 391 
apparatus also increased their opening speed over time in this condition while subjects who had 392 
already experienced the empty apparatus solved it quickly from the first baited trial onwards (and 393 
did not change over time). This suggests that prior experience with the empty apparatus 394 
increased problem-solving performance. Apes facing the baited apparatus first directed their 395 
manipulations towards the food location while this behavior was dramatically reduced in subjects 396 
who had already gained experience with the empty apparatus, demonstrating that experience 397 
with the empty apparatus equaled out the distracting effect of the food reward. These findings 398 
suggest that experience with the functional affordances of the setting narrowed down the 399 
manipulative focus to the relevant parts of the apparatus. Although most subjects opened the 400 
apparatus at least once regardless of the condition, they were more likely to continue to open it 401 
when it was baited than when it was empty. Subjects’ latency to open the empty apparatus 402 
increased over time, showing that intrinsic motivation alone could not keep up performance 403 
without a food reward present. There were marked individual differences in the likelihood of 404 
continuing to open the apparatus in the empty condition, suggesting individually variable levels 405 
of intrinsic motivation to engage with an apparatus in a non-rewarded situation.  406 
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This study suggests that apes open a puzzle box more quickly in a non-rewarded situation 407 
compared to a rewarded one when encountering the puzzle box for the first time. Yet, repeated 408 
exposure to the empty apparatus reduced apes’ overall success (and increased the latency) in this 409 
study which quickly recovered as soon as the apparatus was baited. One possible explanation for 410 
these results may also be found in the modulating effect of motivation. When initially faced with 411 
food inside the apparatus, individuals displayed direct but ineffective actions aimed at obtaining 412 
the food, such as inserting their fingers through the opening. Our finding is consistent with 413 
studies showing that a high extrinsic motivation decreases problem-solving performance (Birch, 414 
1945b; Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Glucksberg, 1964; Suedfeld, Glucksberg, & Vernon, 1967; 415 
Vlamings, Uher, & Call, 2006). For example, chimpanzees performed better in several problem-416 
solving tasks when they were in a state of medium food motivation compared to when it was low 417 
or high  (Birch, 1945b). In a high state of food motivation they also persevered longest with their 418 
original solution strategy even if better ones were available, suggesting a strong focus onto the 419 
food (Birch, 1945b; see also Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Vlamings et al., 2006). In the current 420 
study, persistence in a rather narrow action search may have prevented the emergence of more 421 
indirect solutions, which is precisely what the task required (picking up a seemingly unrelated 422 
stone and dropping it into the tube). This explanation fits with our data on the time spent trying 423 
to directly access the food. Reducing the extrinsic motivational (by removing the food from the 424 
apparatus) may have allowed the emergence of those more indirect actions. However, for this to 425 
work, two requirements must be met: 1) the solution has to be within the subjects’ repertoire and 426 
2) subjects must be intrinsically motivated to manipulate the empty apparatus. In fact, these 427 
requirements were not apparent in a minority of subjects who consistently failed the task. 428 
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The current study demonstrates that exploration, even when it is not accompanied by 429 
extrinsic benefits, improves apes’ problem-solving efficiency. Apes who experienced the empty 430 
apparatus subsequently solved the baited apparatus in a more efficient manner. This is consistent 431 
with other studies showing that non-human primates as well as human children learn about 432 
action-outcome contingencies in non-rewarded situations and use this knowledge subsequently in 433 
a problem-solving task (Birch, 1945a; Polizzi di Sorrentino et al., 2014; Taffoni et al., 2014). By 434 
manipulating the empty apparatus, apes in the current study seemingly extracted information 435 
about the affordances of the apparatus (e.g., its openings), its relation with other elements of the 436 
task (stones) and perhaps even the effect that dropping stones through the upper opening had on 437 
the collapsing platform. Although it is unclear how many of these pieces of information they 438 
acquired that later facilitated opening the baited apparatus, they did so by free exploration. Our 439 
results are consistent with previous studies demonstrating that diversity of exploratory actions 440 
increases problem-solving success in various animal species (e.g., Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 441 
2012; Benson-Amram et al., 2013; Griffin et al., 2014; Griffin & Guez, 2014; Visalberghi & 442 
Fragaszy, 1989). While these studies show the effect of exploration in the presence of food 443 
rewards, our study also investigated the role of exploration without any food reward present and 444 
its impact on subsequent problem-solving, adding an important aspect to the phenomenon. Non-445 
human great apes are well known for their strong exploratory tendency with novel objects (Forss, 446 
Schuppli, Haiden, Zweifel, & van Schaik, 2015; Glickman & Sroges, 1966; Tomasello & Call, 447 
1997; Torigoe, 1985; Welker, 1956), although they show much higher rates of exploration in 448 
captivity than in the wild, as is the case for many animal species (Benson-Amram et al., 2013; 449 
Forss et al., 2015). Great apes show many and diverse object manipulations and are considered 450 
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flexible tool-users so that it would not be surprising if they used their knowledge gained during 451 
free exploration in future problem-solving situations (Call, 2013). 452 
One of the goals of the current study was to assess whether problem-solving influenced 453 
subsequent exploration. Apes from both experimental groups increased the time to solution 454 
across successive sessions in the empty condition, and there was no difference between the two 455 
groups in the first trial of the empty condition concerning latency until success. These findings 456 
suggest that prior experience with the baited apparatus did not influence apes’ performance in the 457 
empty condition subsequently. We further found that apes from both groups manipulated the 458 
apparatus more in the first then the second condition that they received, indicating a general 459 
effect of experience. In the baited condition, this very likely indicates that they became proficient 460 
at extracting the food while in the empty condition this is likely to reflect a decrease in interest. 461 
Interestingly, those individuals who had already solved the baited condition spend less time 462 
manipulating the apparatus in the empty condition than those who had only been exposed to the 463 
empty condition. In other words, having solved the task seemed to suppress to some extent the 464 
amount of time that individuals devoted to manipulating an empty apparatus. 465 
The collapsible platform task was originally developed to study rooks. In a study by Bird 466 
and Emery (2009), these animals succeeded in the task, but they needed to observe the 467 
consequences that their or others’ actions had on the platform when the stone fell onto it. 468 
Although initially rooks did not collect tools to collapse the platform, they did so as soon as they 469 
discovered the effects that stones had on the platform. And once they had done so they displayed 470 
a remarkable ability to select appropriate tools that varied in terms of size and weight to solve the 471 
task. Similarly, New Caledonian crows solved the collapsible platform task, but they required 472 
additional information about the apparatus (von Bayern et al., 2009). Nevertheless, it is difficult 473 
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to directly compare those two corvid species with the results of the current study partly because 474 
although our apes had never faced the collapsible platform apparatus, they had inserted tokens, 475 
water, or tools inside tubes to obtain rewards. This experience, however, should not be equated 476 
with having solved the current task. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why they did not solve 477 
the task right away, and the reason for the differences between conditions and individuals. It is 478 
true that the six apes who did not solve the task had less experience with tasks in general than 479 
successful subjects, but they were also either rather young or quite old and therefore we cannot 480 
be sure whether a lack of experience caused their failure (see also Manrique & Call, 2015). A 481 
recent study found that some naïve chimpanzees solved the collapsible platform task even 482 
though they lacked the experience of the apes included in the current study (Schmelz et al., 483 
unpublished data). Furthermore, another study suggested that orang-utans who regularly 484 
participated in cognitive studies performed at similar levels as orang-utans without such 485 
experience in several tasks on physical cognition (Forss & van Schaik, 2014; see also Forss, 486 
Willems, Call, & van Schaik, 2016). At least in that study, prior experience with experimental 487 
tasks did not increase subjects’ performance compared to naïve individuals. 488 
We found large individual differences with regard to the time spent manipulating the 489 
empty apparatus that may reflect differences in intrinsic and even extrinsic motivation. While 490 
some apes continued to drop stones into the tube and to manipulate the apparatus, others stopped 491 
these activities after a shorter period of time. This variability may reflect consistent individual 492 
differences in exploratory tendencies that have been found in great apes and other animal species 493 
(e.g., Uher et al., 2008; Zampachova et al., 2017), although we have no evidence of its temporal 494 
stability from this study. Also individual levels of persistence may account for apes’ variability 495 
in the empty condition. However, two types of persistence may be involved here. Apes first 496 
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facing the empty condition may have been persistent in exploring the apparatus due to an 497 
intrinsic motivation. However, apes who first encountered the baited apparatus potentially 498 
exhibited a carry-over effect in the empty condition because they had been extrinsically 499 
rewarded for the solution before. Here, persistence may reflect an extrinsic motivation. 500 
Interestingly, the distribution of apes with regard to the number of stones they dropped into the 501 
tube in the empty condition was similar for both groups, suggesting that after an initial phase of 502 
potential extrinsic motivation at least some apes might have been intrinsically motivated to 503 
explore the apparatus further. Persistence is thought to be an essential component of flexible 504 
problem-solving (e.g., Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Chow, Lea, & Leaver, 2016; Griffin 505 
et al., 2014; Huebner & Fichtel, 2015; Manrique, Völter, & Call, 2013). However, persistence 506 
alone may be insufficient in some situations unless it appears in combination with the use of 507 
different actions (i.e., exploration). For example, if we had disabled the original solution (e.g., by 508 
blocking the opening of the tube) and had provided a novel one (e.g., pressing down the platform 509 
through a hole at the side), persistence in manipulating the apparatus would have only worked if 510 
individuals also had explored alternative ways to access the reward (Auersperg, von Bayern, 511 
Gajdon, Huber, & Kacelnik, 2011; Manrique et al., 2013). Thus, those individuals exhibiting 512 
high levels of exploration in the empty condition may have the potential to be the best problem-513 
solvers. To test this, one probably would have to use a task with a greater level of difficulty than 514 
the current one in which most apes did relatively well. 515 
In conclusion, our data confirmed that exploration in a non-rewarded situation can 516 
enhance future problem-solving performance in non-human great apes. But additionally, we 517 
observed that problem-solving narrowed the type of exploration that individuals did after solving 518 
the task to obtain a food reward. This means that the relation between exploration and problem-519 
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solving is bidirectional. Another aspect of this study was the modulatory effect of extrinsic and 520 
intrinsic motivation on performance. Extrinsic motivation initially hindered the discovery of a 521 
solution but eventually aided it in sustaining performance over time after a solution was found. 522 
Such sustained performance could not be apparently maintained by an intrinsic motivation alone. 523 
Nevertheless, even in the baited condition subjects managed to solve the task, which means that 524 
the effect of motivation was not so strong as to completely prevent the appearance of the 525 
solution. It is conceivable that confronted with a greater incentive or a more difficult apparatus, 526 
prior experience might have been the key to success. One could say that while the intrinsic 527 
motivation provided the ignition for the acquisition process, extrinsic motivation subsequently 528 
fueled it on the longer run. 529 
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Table 1. Results for the individual predictors for the model with success as the response. 695 
Term Estimate SE lowerCL upperCL χ2 Df P 
Intercept 0.510 0.383 -0.357 1.274 (4) (4) (4) 
Condition (empty) (2) -1.071 0.229 -1.643 -0.666 (4) (4) (4) 
Session (1) 0.007 0.070 -0.131 0.145 (4) (4) (4) 
Group (baited first) (2) 0.150 0.392 -0.675 1.002 0.15 1 0.702 
Species (chimp) (2) -1.050 0.551 -2.332 0.012 5.56 (3) 3 (3) 0.135 (3) 
Species (gorilla) (2) -0.964 0.586 -2.304 0.181 (4) (4) (4) 
Species (orang) (2) -0.187   0.461 -1.182 0.791 (4) (4) (4) 
Sex (male) (2) 0.161 0.403 -0.679 1.041 0.16 1 0.688 
Age (1) -0.519 0.251 -1.122 -0.055 4.76 1 0.029 
Duration of stay (1) 1.094 0.283 0.622 1.811 19.89 1 <0.001 
Condition (empty) (2) 
x Session (1) 
-0.411 0.131 -0.708 -0.157 10.00 1 0.002 
(1) log-transformed (age), standardized to its mean (age, duration of stay, session) 696 
(2) reference categories: condition (baited), group (empty first), species (bonobo), sex (female) 697 
(3) overall effect of the predictor (species) 698 
(4) not shown because of having a very limited interpretation 699 
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Table 2. Results for the individual predictors for the model with survival time as response. 701 
Term Estimate SE χ2 Df P 
Group (baited first) (2) -1.347 0.894 (4) (4) (4) 
Condition (empty) (2) -3.232 0.617 (4) (4) (4) 
Session (1) 0.013 0.199 (4) (4) (4) 
Species (chimp) (2) 1.319 1.360 (4) (4) (4) 
Species (orang) (2) -0.204 0.891 (4) (4) (4) 
Sex (male) (2) -1.106 0.752 2.10 1 0.148 
Age (1) 1.083 0.612 3.08 1 0.079 
Duration of stay (1) -0.505 0.707 0.54 1 0.462 
Group (baited first) x Condition (empty) (2) 0.706 0.669 (4) (4) (4) 
Group (baited first) x Session (1,2) 1.077 0.282 (4) (4) (4) 
Condition (empty) x Session (1,2) -0.699 0.368 (4) (4) (4) 
Condition (empty) x Species (chimp) (2) 0.701 0.846 7.00 (3) 2 (3) 0.030 (3) 
Condition (empty) x Species (orang) (2) 2.093 0.741 (4) (4) (4) 
Group (baited first) x Condition (empty) x 
Session (1,2) 
-1.662 0.545 8.40 1 0.004 
 (1) log-transformed (age), standardized to its mean (age, duration of stay, session) 702 
(2) reference categories: group (empty first), condition (baited), species (bonobo), sex (female) 703 
(3) overall effect of the interaction (condition x species) 704 
(4) not shown because of having a very limited interpretation   705 
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Table 3. Results for the individual predictors for the model with latency to success in the first 706 
trials as the response. 707 
Term Estimate SE lowerCL upperCL χ2 Df P 
Intercept 2.272 0.466 -4.697 8.315 (2) (2) (2) 
Group (baited first) (1) 2.263 0.659 -6.924 12.075 (2) (2) (2) 
Condition (empty) (1) 1.197 0.634 -0.040 2.485 (2) (2) (2) 
Group (baited first) x 
Condition (empty) (1) 
-2.482 0.896 -4.168 -0.707 6.40 1 0.011 
(1) reference categories: group (empty first), condition (baited) 708 
(2) not shown because of having a very limited interpretation  709 
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Table 4. Results for the individual predictors for the model with manipulation in the first trials as 710 
the response. 711 
Term Estimate SE lowerCL upperCL χ2 Df P 
Intercept 1.308 0.435 0.425 2.191 (2) (2) (2) 
Group (baited first) (1) 2.350 0.615 1.102 3.599 (2) (2) (2) 
Condition (empty) (1) 1.286 0.615 0.038 2.535 (2) (2) (2) 
Group (baited first) x 
Condition (empty) (1) 
-3.685 0.870 -5.450 -1.919 13.86 1 <0.001 
(1) reference categories: group (empty first), condition (baited) 712 
(2) not shown because of having a very limited interpretation   713 
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Table 5. Results for the individual predictors for the model with duration of food directed 714 
actions in the first trials as the response. 715 
Term Estimate SE lowerCL upperCL χ2 Df P 
Intercept 0.639 0.442 -0.243 1.525 (2) (2) (2) 
Group (baited first) (1) 1.712 0.625 0.483 2.897 (2) (2) (2) 
Condition (empty) (1) 1.130 0.625 -0.106 2.350 (2) (2) (2) 
Group (baited first) x 
Condition (empty) (1) 
-2.792 0.884 -4.485 -1.032 8.54 1 0.003 
(1) reference categories: group (empty first), condition (baited) 716 
(2) not shown because of having a very limited interpretation   717 
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Figure 1. The task required apes to drop a stone into a tube to release a platform inside the 718 
apparatus. 719 
  720 
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Figure 2. Mean number of successful trials per session in the baited (A) and the empty condition 721 
(B) as a function of group and session. 722 
   723 
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Figure 3. Latency to success in the baited (A) and the empty condition (B) as a function of group 724 
and session. Please note that we plotted latencies only here for reasons of visualization, yet, the 725 
survival time is a compound of success and latency. Grey: baited-first group, white: empty-first 726 
group (median; boxes: 0.25, 0.75; whiskers: 0.025, 0.975) 727 
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Figure 4. Latency to success (A) and latency to touch the stones (B) as a function of condition 729 
and group in the first trial of each condition. Grey: baited-first group, white: empty-first group 730 
(median; boxes: 0.25, 0.75; whiskers: 0.025, 0.975) 731 
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Figure 5. Manipulation time (A) and more specifically, food-directed actions (B) as a function of 733 
condition and group in the first trial of each condition. Grey: baited-first group, white: empty-734 
first group (median; boxes: 0.25, 0.75; whiskers: 0.025, 0.975) 735 
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